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Abstract 
Transit operating subsidy allocation procedures based on such factors as deficit or 
population have been under attack ever since operating subsidy became widespread in 
the 1970s. These procedures do not directly provide any incentive for innovation, cost 
cutting strategies, and efficient operation. Recognizing the problems associated with a 
100 percent population-based formula, the State of Indiana, since 1986, has used transit 
performance as a part of its subsidy allocation procedure. This paper examines the im-
pact of this procedure on transit sy~tem self-reliance, efficiency, and effectiveness by 
analyzing the relevant data between the periods before and after the procedure was insti-
tuted The results show that the procedure has positively affected transit system perfor-
mance, partict_flarly for small-and medium-sized properties. The largest positive change 
has been realized in transit system effectiveness and self-reliance, while no perceptible 
change was observed in transit system efficiency. 
Introduction -~ 
Since the 1970s, government financial support for public transport opera-
tions grew at the same time that operating losses and investment needs for public 
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transport increased. The total operating subsidy from all levels of government 
(local, state, and federal) rose it..?m $318 million in ~ 970 to $9268 million in 
1990, a near thirty-fold increase in 20 years (Pucher 1995). This tremendous 
increase in subsidies was justified by the prevailing philosophy of keeping fares 
below operating costs and maintaining and expanding services, regardless of 
their profitability (Cervero 1984). It was expected that transit would play a key 
role in achieving the following objectives: 
• preserving and revitalizing the cities; 
• creating a more efficient and less costly-in terms of energy-form of 
transport; 
• creating a better urban environment, mainly in terms of traffic conges-
tion and pollution; 
• continuing the use of the existing public transport infrastructure; 
• satisfying the transport needs of the ''underprivileged" ( the elderly, people 
with disabilities, people in remote areas, etc.); and 
• helping "captive" users who might be paying an increasing amount of 
money for decreasing service (Altshuler 1981 ). 
In gen.era!, subsidizing a commodity necessitates the diversion of resources 
away from other {more productive) uses; this becomes a strong argument against 
charging less than the true economic price of the commodity (i.e., subsidizing a 
commodity). Nevertheless, if one section of the traveling community (automo-
bile users) is already paying less than the true costs of travel (when social costs 
are included), subsidizing public transportation may be one way of redressing 
the balance (Bly et al. 1980). 
Unfortunately, the effects of operating subsidies on performance and pro-
ductivity of transit systems have not been encouraging. Many authors contended 
that subsidies had encouraged productivity declines, lack of innovation and ini-
tiative, and financial mismanagement of transit properties. Arguments against 
subsidies appeared from the very beginning of the transit subsidization legisla-
tion (Meyer et al. 1965). Many authors also argued that the benefits from subsi-
dies to transit riders were negligible relative to the levels of subsidies; they also 
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proposed that the environmental and secondary financial benefits were nonexist-
ent (Altshuler et al. 1981, Bonnell 1981, Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez 1981, Hilton 
1974, Hammer 1976, U.S. House of Representatives 1981, Webber 1976). 
In recent years, many studies have been performed using a large number of 
different methodological approaches to investigate empirically the effects of op-
erating assistance on the performance of transit systems. Pucher, Markstedt and 
Hirschman (1983), Anderson (1983), Cervero (1984, 1986), Pickrell (1985), and 
Bly and Oldfield ( 1986) used different multiple regression models to quantify 
the effects of subsidies. While the specific results varied among the studies, it 
was concluded that there are clear links between increases in subsidies, on one 
hand, and reductions in performance and productivity, on the other. Moreover, as 
Bly and Oldfield (1986) reported, "the time-lagged regression suggested that, to 
some extent, the increases in cost followed, rather than preceded, the increases in 
subsidy .... This leaves the suspicion that subsidy may have encouraged a loss of 
efficiency." Recently, Obeng, Talley and Colburn (1995), using a translog cost 
function, found that transit costs were positively related to transit subsidies; that 
is, increases in subsidies were related to increases in transit operating costs. 
To deal with the reality of the negative influence of subsidies on the perfor-
mance of transit systems, many authors suggested that a performance-based allo-
cation formula be used in subsidizing public transit (Lamare 1980, Miller 1980, 
Crider and Sinha 1982, Pucher and Markstedt 1983, Pucher, Markstedt and 
Hirschman 1983, Pucher 1995). Such a formula would reward those systems that 
raise productivity, attract new passengers, and enhance operating efficiency. In-
deed, proposals were made for the implementation of various approaches of per-
formance-based state transit subsidy allocation programs in California (in 1971 ), 
Pennsylvanfa (in 1978), New York (in 1979), Iowa (in 1982), and Indiana (in 
1985). A survey of the different states' subsidy allocation procedures as of the 
early 1980s can be found in Sinha et al. ( 1985). 
This paper seeks to examine the effects of the performance-based subsidy 
allocation procedure on the performance of Indi~na transit sy~tems. Using data 
from all the fixed-schedule, fixed-route transit systems in Indiana for an 18-year 
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period ( 1977-1994 ),this paper investigates whether there was a significant change 
in the performance of the transit systems between the pre-and the post-perfor-
mance-based subsidy allocation periods. The paper is organized as follows: the 
first section describes the operating subsidy allocation procedure implemented 
in Indiana in 1986; the second section describes the data and the analysis meth-
odology; the third section interprets the results obtained from the study; and the 
last section summarizes the findings of this study. 
The Subsidy Allocation Procedure 
Federal and State Practices 
Until June 1985, Indiana's state subsidy allocation procedure followed the 
population-based federal allocation formula. From 1974 through 1985, the amount 
of federal operating assistance that could be obtained under Section 5 was prima-
rily based on population and population density factors. That is, the National 
Mass Transportation Act of 1974 allocated funds based half on the recipient's 
population as a percentage of total eligible population and half on the percentage 
of the total of the recipient's population density multiplied by the population. At 
the federal level, the application of such an allocation procedure presented sev-
eral weaknesses that needed to be addressed. First, the supply of federal funds 
was not optimally matched with each area's relative use of urban mass transit. 
While the formula attempted to distribute the assistance equitably by using the 
population/population density formula and by setting aside funds for the largest 
areas, federal support per passenger, per vehicle mile, and as a percentage of 
expenses became much higher in some areas than others. Second, deficits were 
rewarded. Because federal operating assistance was limited to 50 percent of a 
system's deficit, the larger the deficit, the more funds could be received. Finally, 
the allocation procedure provided no incentive for systems to improve opera-
tional efficiency and to attain federal transit goals. 
There is little overall uniformity among the states in methods used to allo-
cate state transit funds. The Public Mass Transportation Fund (PMTF, Indiana's 
state subsidy program) is a special revenue fund created by the 1980 Indiana 
General Assembly to assist public transportation in the state. According to stat-
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ute, funds in the PMTF are to be used solely for the promotion and development 
of public mass transportation. The PMTF evolved from a state grant program 
established in 1975. Part of the program called for annual general fund appro-
priations designed to assist local units of government in matching public trans-
portation grants provided under the Federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964. It was strictly a matching grant program to augment local matching funds 
at a time when municipal corporations were under financial constraints imposed 
by the property tax control program. 
In creating the PMTF, the General Assembly changed the funding source 
from a general funds appropriation to a dedicated 0.76 percent of the state's 5 
percent general sales and use tax. In addition to creating a dedicated source of 
funds, the General Assembly also increased the state's participation in the local 
share of a federal grant from one-half to two-thirds. The PM~F was originally set 
at 0.95 percent of the 4 percent general sales and use tax. The PMTF allows any 
municipal corporation that receives a federal mass transit grant to apply for state 
assistance. Until July 1985, the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) 
made PMTF allocations based on the grant recipient's service area population. 
Service area population included the population within the municipal corporation's 
taxing unit or urbanized area as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau in the decen-
nial census. 
When the subsidy program began in 1975, service area p'opulation seemed 
to be the only generally agreed-upon basis to allocate state funds. However, the 
INDOT found that the primary attribute of the population factor-that of stabil-
ity-was also its major drawback. In using a 100 percent population-based for-
mula, the INDOT was unable to respond to changes in the operation and financ-
ing of local transit service. Recognizing this disadvantage, a study was under-
taken to examine alternative strategies (Sinha et al. 1984 ). The first step in this 
study was to establish the objectives involved in transit fund allocation, which 
were identified as sustenance, incentive, and innovation. Sustenance implies that 
transit systems remain in operation through adeqtl~~e funding. Incentive aspects 
are intended to motivate a system to perform at a higher level than a given mini-
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mum service standard. Innovation is intended to encourage a system to try new 
concepts and ideas to impro-ve service and control cost. 
~;" 
Incorporation of Performance Indicators in 
Transit Subsidy Allocation Procedure in Indiana 
The primary objective was to find a way to optimally allocate the limited 
resources available to accomplish as closely as possible the stated objectives. 
The new subsidy allocation procedure should motivate transit systems to control 
cost and improve service while encouraging them to seek out new sources of 
funding from the private sector. Those systems. that strive to improve productiv-
ity and provide innovative services or pursue innovative financing schemes should 
be given proper credit in terms of fund allocation (Sinha et al. 1985). 
In consultation with the transit operators and INDOT personnel, it was de-
cided that the factors that would be included in the allocation procedure should 
be fair, equitable, and auditable. Most performance indicators that met the crite-
ria mentioned above were considered. (Extensive analysis of transit system per-
formance definition and measurement has been done by Fielding et al. [1978]). 
Many performance indicators represent similar attributes, and the selection of 
one eliminated the others. Some other indicators required data that were not re-
ported by the Indiana systems. Finally, those indicators that best capture the state 
subsidy allocation goals were selected. After a series of intensive discussions 
with operators and transit board members, it was decided that the following three 
performance indicators would provide the basis for the allocation procedure: 
• Operating Ratio: 9omputed as the ratio oflocally-derived income (LDI) 
over operating expense. LDI includes operating revenue, local subsidy, 
and private contributions. This indicator was used to capture the self 
sufficiency of a system along with the local commitment o the provi-
sion of transit service. 
• Passengers per Capita (PC): used to capture the degree to which the 
residents in a particular area patronize their transit service. Also, it is an 
indicator of the reliability and service effectiveness. 
• Passengers per Revenue Vehicle Mile (RPVM): measures service utili-
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zation. It also represents the effectiveness of the operation as it indicates 
passenger utilization throughout he system. 
The necessary data for the computation of these indicators is either directly 
auditable ( operating revenue and expense data) or can be readily checked on the 
basis of historical records, on-site inspection, and by cross checking with other 
financial data. To account for the wide diversity in the transit systems in Indiana, 
ranging from fairly large metropolitan systems to rural countywide systems, and 
capture the differences in operating characteristics, the systems were clustered in 
four groups: large, medium, small, and demand-responsive. Table 1 includes some 
of the characteristics of the first three groups. 
The formula that was selected for allocating the state subsidy in Indiana is a 
four step process (Sinha et al. 1985): 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics ofthe Different System Categories (1994) 
Large Medium Small 
Std. Std. Std. 
Characteristic Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. 
# of Systems 4 8 9 
Service Area 
Population 503,954 193,429 81,253 30,658 27,279 8,723 
Total Vehicles 135 118 30 15 9 4 
Full-time 
Employees 265 244 47 18 12 6 
Tot. Vehicle Miles 3,111,719 1,329,266 824,860 385,922 180,031 99,775 
Passengers - 5,171,486 1,481,231 991,031 521,241 140,927 95,165 
State Subsidy ($) 2,064,430 · 508,715 307,663 155,194 88,646 32,559 
% State Subsidy 
of Total Subsidy 19.6 3.1 25.8 2.6 29.1 2.4 
% of System Deficit 133"· Covered by PMTF 11.0 2.1 3.2 18.4 3.3 
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1. Distrib~te 50 percent of the total available PMTF directly to each transit 
system according to th~ervice area population of each system to satisfy 
the sustenance requirements. 
2. Divide the remaining 50 percent of the funds into four amounts accord-
ing to the subsidy needs of each group (i.e., large, medium, small, and 
demand-responsive) in relation to the total statewide subsidy require-
ment, as follows: 
Group Allocation = 0.5 x PMTF x (Grou.p deficit/Total statewide deficit) 
3. Suballocate each group amount among systems within the group in pro-
portion to the following three factors: 
OR* LDI 
L (OR* LDI) 
n 
PC* LDI 
L (PC* LDI) 
n 
RPVM* LDI 
L (RPVM* LDI) 
n 
where, 
OR = Operating ratio= LDI/Operating expense 
LDI = Locally-derived income= farebox and other direct revenue 
+ local subsidy + private contribution 
PC = Passenger trips per capita of service area population 
RPVM = Passenger trips per revenue vehicle mile of operation 
n = number of systems in a particular group 
4. The total allocation to a system is the summation of the amount derived 
in Step 1 in addition to the amount obtained in Step 3. It should be noted 
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that the amount of state subsidy for a given year is based on the perfor-
mance indicators of the previous year. This suggests that there is a one-
year lag between the data year and the allocation year ( for example, 1994 
data are used in allocating funds for 1995). 
This performance-based state subsidy allocation procedure was adopted by 
the State oflndiana in 1985, and 1986 was the first year in which the state sub-
sidy was allocated based on this procedure. Transit operators were generally in 
support of the change, as there was now an accountable procedure that could 
connect subsidies with actions under their control. There were, however, some 
occasional complaints about the performance-based formula, particularly in re-
lation to the group allocation of subsidies and the high weight assigned to LDI. 
Thus, although the formula was found to be sufficiently equitable and satisfac-
tory to the transit operators during its existence over the past decade, the INDOT 
is currently reviewing the subsidy allocation procedure for possible modifica-
tions. 
It is important o note the sensitivity of the allocation formula to the various 
performance measures used to allocate the available state funds. The formula 
places a high weight on local financial contribution which, based on the opinions 
of both Indiana transit operators and the INDOT, is the most important factor 
with respect to transit investment activities. To this end, innovative financing 
and local financial contribution to transit is rewarded highly by the existing for-
mula. For example, in Muncie, a ~pecial taxing district, the Public Transit Corpo-
ration (PTC), was formed. The PTC, which allocates a proportion of the Muncie 
property tax for local transit support, raises approximately $2.2 million in LDI 
annually. Terre Haute, on the other hand, which has neither established a PTC 
nor found any other innovative sources of financing or local contribution, raises 
only $350,000 in LDI annually. As a result, and based on the allocation formula, 
Muncie receives approximately $785,000 in state subsidy, while Terre Haute re-
ceives approximately $250,000 in state subsidy. As noted by TCRP (1994), "The 
[Indiana state subsidy] allocatfon formula reflects-(}~ite clearly what Indiana con-
siders to be important with respect to its transit activities." 
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The next section examines the impact of this procedure and estimates whether 
there was a change in the LD~nd the performance indicators (OR, PC, RPVM) 
of the large, medium, and small systems as a result of this subsidy allocation 
procedure in the past nine years. 
Data Analysis 
The aim of the analysis was to examine the statistical relationship of the 
average values ofLDI and the performance indicators between the period before 
and after the performance-based subsidy allocation procedure was instituted. This 
analysis uses the AN OVA method to compare the means ofLDI and of the three 
indicators for the different periods and to establish whether there is a statistically 
significant difference in the means (between the periods). If the means differ 
between the periods, this could lead to the conclusion that performance-based 
subsidy allocation has had a significant effect on the performance of the systems. 
The available data spanned a period of 18 years ( 1977-1994 ).The financial 
data were discounted using the Public Transportation deflator of the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) to 1985 dollars and then subdivided into three subgroups: 1977-
1985, which is the period before the performance-based subsidy allocation pro-
cedure was instituted (Pre); 1986-1990, which is the first period after the proce-
dure was instituted (Post 1 ); 1991-1994, which is the second period after the 
procedure was instituted (Post 2). The data were subdivided into these three group-
ings rather than two (Pre and Post) to enable us to examine whether the perfor-
mance-based subsidy allocation had an immediate impact on the systems (by 
comparing Pre to Post 1 ), or whether the systems took some time to adjust to the 
new procedure (by comparing Postl to Post 2). ANOVA was applied separately 
to the three categories of systems; that is, the large, medium, and small systems 
were examined separately. 
The first step in the analysis was to use ANOVA to verify the a priori hy-
pothesis that the mean values of the three indicators for the three classes of sys-
tems are different (Table 2 gives the average values for LDI and for the three 
performance indicators for the three categories of systems). Table 3 shows the 
results for the ANOVA, testing the null hypothesis that the average values of the 
Winter 1997 
Journal of Public Transportation 11 
Table2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Three Performance Indicators 
and LDI (1977-1994) 
Large Systems Medium Systems Small Systems 
Indicator Mean Dev. Mean Dev. Mean Dev. 
LDI ($) 5,456,394 1,493,932 595,227 311,335 i02,749 81,423 
OR 0.4518 0.09 0.3528 0.1 I 0.4105 0.22 
PC 13.67 5.68 12.73 2.59 6.33 2.02 
RPVM 1.39 0.48 0.9 0.3 0.71 0.25 
three indicator means for the three system classes for the 1977-1994 period are 
equal. The value of the F-statistic indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
leading to the conclusion that the values of the performance indicators for the three 
categories of systems are indeed significantly different. 
It is worth noting that the conclusions of the present research have been 
drawn based on the assumption that state subsidy is the only item affecting per-
formance. Transit systems are regulated monopolies which, in allocating their 
resources, respond to specific regulatory constraints as well as to the level and 
composition of the market demand they face. It is thus likely that there exist 
other factors that also affect transit performance. Labor costs and form of owner-
ship (public or private) are among tpe most important factors. Orski ( 1985) found 
that the effects of demand peaks on fleet size and the expansion of services to 
low density suburban areas are contributors to cost escalation and decline in 
transit produ~ivity. Caves and Christensen (1988) found that speed, size of net-
work, and average trip length have significant effects on performance. However, 
these factors have not significantly changed for the Indiana systems during the 
period of this study. The results reported here have examined the effect on transit 
system performance from the change in state s~~dy allocation procedure for 
Indiana, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 3 
AN OVA Table for Compa)it!g Indicator Means _for Different System Sizes 
Sumo/ Mean 
Indicator Source Squares df Square F p-value 
OR Size (model) 0.535968 2 0.2679 10.551 0.0001 
Error 7.241606 285 0.0254 
Total 7.777574 287 
PC Size (model) 9019.4 2 4509.7 208.21 0.0001 
Error 6173.3 285 21.66 
Total 15192.7 287 
RPVM Size (model) 57.87 2 28.93 212.38 0.0001 
Error 38.84 285 0.13 
Total 96.71 287 
0 statistically significant at the 95% level 
The OR (operating ratio) was the first measure to be examined (Figure 1 
shows the trends in OR for the different classes of systems). The first step of the 
analysis examined whether there is significant difference in the OR of the three 
categories of systems between the Pre and the Post 1 periods. From Table 4 it can 
be inferred that there was a statistically-significant difference in the OR values 
between these periods for the large and the small systems (in both cases, the OR 
decreased in the Post 1 period). Then, the difference in OR was examined for the 
Post 1 and the Post 2 periods. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the OR 
values for the medium and small systems increased in the Post 2 period, while 
they were not significantly different between these two periods for the large systems. 
Then, the passengers per capita were examined (Figure 2). In the Pre-Post 1 
comparison, it was determined that there was a significant difference between 
the mean indicator values for the large and small systems; for both the large and 
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ANOVA Table for Comparing Indicator and LDI Means, by Period ;:: ~ 
c=;· 
Large Systems Medium Systems Small Systems 
I If ~ Indicator Period F-value p-value %change F-value p-value %change F-value p-value %change ~ B' 
-. C 
LDI Pre-Post I 4.298 0.04 -13.3-0 0.87 0.35 C 3.09b 0.08 -3.60 I 1::S 
LDI Post 1 - Post 2 0.09 0.77 C 6.78 0.009 22.23 12.432 0.0005 14.30 
OR Pre - Post I 5.78 0.01 -5.20 0.06 0.8 C 12.128 0.0007 -18 
OR Post 1 - Post 2 1.17 0.28 C 12.921 0.0007 22.10 3.43b 0.07 4 
PC Pre - Post 1 7.831 0.006 6.90 0.7 0.4 C 11.868 0.0008 15 
PC i'' ~ Post 1 - Post 2 - 0.11 0.73 C 8.161 0.006 10 14.492 0.0004 24 
RPVM Pre - Post 1 26.382 0.0001 -22.70 0.73 0.39 C 0.87 0.35 
RPVM Post 1 - Post 2 1.88 0.17 C 0.1 0.92 C 2.2 0.14 
0 statistically significant at the 95% level 
6 statistically significant at the 90% level 
' statistically not significant 
i 
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Figure 1. Trends in operating ratio for systems of different size. 
Figure 2. li'ends in passengers per capita for systems of different size. 
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the small systems the value of this indicator was increased in the Post 1 period. In 
the Post 1-Post 2 period comparisons, the F-statistic values indicate that, for the 
medium and small systems, there was a statistically-significant positive change. 
The passengers per revenue vehicle miles mean comparison (Figure 3 ), dem-
onstrated a significant change only for the large systems between the Pre and 
Post 1 periods. For the Post 1-Post 2 comparison, there were no significant changes 
in the values of the indicators for any system group. The LDI was significantly 
decreased for both large and small systems between the Pre and the Post 1 peri-
ods, while it significantly increased for the medium and small systems between 
the Post 1 and Post 2 periods (Figures 4, 5, and 6). 
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Figure 4. Trends in locally-derived income-large systems. 
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Figure 5. Trends in locally-derived income-medium systems. 
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Figure 6. Trends in locally-derived income-small systems. 
Interpretation of Results 
By Indicator 
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The statistical analysis performed in this paper indicates that the OR and the 
LDI, representing system self-sufficiency and local commitment o public trans-
portation, were originally negatively affected by the performance-based subsidy 
allocation procedure. While the· statistical analysis does show that these perfor-
mance measures were negatively affected by the allocation procedure, Figures 1, 
4, 5, and 6 seem to show that these indicators were on negative trends that were 
not impacted until some later time. Furthermore, given the one-year lag between 
the data and allocation years, the Post 1-Post 2 comparison indicates that, given 
some time for systems to adapt to the new procedure, the performance-based 
subsidy allocation eventually raised the OR and the LDI for the medium and 
small systems. It is interesting to notice that the OR, which captures the part of 
revenues absorb~d by operating costs, and the LDC\vhich mirrors the pure change 
in operating revenues, have realized the same changes in sign; that is, in both 
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cases the large and small systems were originally negatively affected by the change 
in allocation procedure, while ~entually the medium and small systems realized 
,. 
a significant increase in both OR and LDI. · 
The passengers per capita indicator, which captures transit system eff ec-
tiveness and patronage, was positively affected by the change in subsidy alloca-
tion across the board. The large and small systems were immediately affected by 
the change in subsidy allocation, increasing their passengers per capita by ap-
proximately 7 percent for large and 15 percent for small systems. In the next 
phase (Post I-Post 2), the medium and small systems were positively affected by 
realizing an increase of 10 percent and 24 percent, respectively, in their value of 
passengers per capita indicator. It is very important o note that system effective-
ness and reliability were positively affected for all system sizes. 
The passengers per revenue vehicle mile indicator, which captures service 
efficiency and utilization, was significantly affected only in the first period, and 
only for the large systems. The passengers per revenue vehicle mile indicator for 
large systems decreased, on the average, 23 percent between the Pre and Post 1 
periods. In all other cases, the values of this indicator for all the systems were left 
unchanged by the new subsidy allocation procedure. 
By System Size 
What is apparent from the statistical analysis performed in the previous 
section is that the small systems were the ones most dramatically affected by the : 
switch in subsidy allocation procedure. They were affected in a positive manner, 
in terms of both self-reliance and local commitment, as well as patronage and 
effectiveness. The OR and LDI values for the small systems decreased in the first 
period after the change in allocation procedure, but eventually recovered fully 
(in the case of LDI) or are in the process of recovering to their original val ties for 
the OR indicator. It is also interesting to note that the effectiveness of small sys-
tems (measured with the passengers per capita indicator) was aided tremendously 
by the_ change in allocation procedure, increasing by 15 percent in the Pre-Postl 
period, and by 24 percent in the Post 1-Post 2 period. 
The medium systems were also positively affected by the switch in alloca-
tion procedure. Their self-reliance and local commitment improved by approxi-
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mately 22 percent ( same increase for both the OR and LDI values), their patron-
age and effectiveness increased by 10 percent, and their efficiency was left un-
changed. The large systems were the only ones whose performance did not re-
spond favorably to the objectives of the subsidy allocation procedure. The LDI 
for the areas served by the systems and the OR decreased in the first period by 
approximately 13 percent and 5 percent, respectively. Their efficiency decreased 
by 22 percent, and only their effectiveness improved, by approximately 7 per-
cent. It should be noted, however, that from Figure 3 it can be inferred that the 
large systems already had been realizing a significant decrease in their passen-
gers per revenue vehicle mile levels before the change in allocation procedure 
was instituted. That is, this decrease could be a general change in large system 
efficiency and not a direct result of the change in allocation procedure. 
By Period 
Large systems were immediately affected by the change in state subsidy 
allocation procedure in a negative way, with the exception of effectiveness. This 
category of systems showed no statistically-significant change in the second pe-
riod (Post 2) after the change: 
Medium systems, which were positively affected by the change in terms of 
both self-reliance and effectiveness, required some time to adjust to, and realize 
improvements from, the change in allocation procedure. The values for the indi-
cators of the medium systems showed an increase of 22 percent for the OR and 
LDI indicators and 13 percent.for the passengers per capita indicators in the 
second period (Post 2). 
The small systems, which by and large were positively affected by the change, 
realized large positive effects in the second period after the change (Post 2). In 
the first period after the change, the patronage and effectiveness of the small 
systems was increased, while their self-reliance decreased. Again, the effective-
ness of these systems was left unchanged in both periods. 
Conclusions -~ 
Although the findings of the statistical amtlysis utilized in this paper vary 
depending on system size, type of performance indicator ( self-reliance or effec-
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tiveness or service utilization), and time period, they support the same conclu-
sion. Performance-based subsid~allocation has helped transit systems of all sizes 
to largely improve their accessibility and has helped medium-and small-sized 
transit systems improve their self-reliance and local support. Service efficiency 
has, by and large, been unaffected by this change. The large systems have not 
responded in the same way as the smaller systems, but it should be noted that 
large systems are the ones whose percentage contribution of state subsidy to total 
subsidy is the lowest (Table 1 ). The largest part of subsidy for the large systems 
comes from the population-based federal subsidy program, which does not di-
rectly encourage system efficiency or innovation. The size of the state subsidy 
does not provide sufficient motivation for large systems to change. 
It has been the stated policy of the INDOT to encourage increased local 
financial commitment o transit. Therefore, as state and federal funds become 
increasingly limited, only those systems that indicate a strong local commitment 
may be able to remain in operation. It can be expected that, for some systems, the 
local assistance will increase in the case of a severe federal cut. On the other 
hand, some systems may not receive any additional ocal assistance, nor can they 
remain viable through service-cut and fare increases. Those systems, most likely, 
will not be able to continue operating and will be candidates for elimination from 
the state assistance program. The performance-based subsidy allocation proce-
dure can be of assistance in determining which systems are viable (in terms of 
seeking innovative financing methods and demonstrating strong local commit-
ment to public transit) and should remain in service, and which are not. 
As suggested in this study, tightly-controlled and performance-based sub-
sidy allocations can have a positive effect, at least in terms of effectiveness and 
self-reliance, on public transit systems. A good and promising way to subsidize 
transit systems is to tie both federal and state assistance to performance indica-
tors. By penalizing inefficient systems and rewarding efficient ones, such an ar-
rangement would at least reduce the incentive for unwarranted cost escalation 
(Pucher 1983 ). This would be a sharp contrast to the current situation in which 
the greater the cost generated, the greater the subsidy received. Although it is 
Winter 1997 
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impossible to detach inefficiency from government subsidies, a perfonnance-
based allocation could be a step in the right direction. ❖ 
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